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Clennan: How to Deter Pedestrian Deaths

HOW TO DETER PEDESTRIAN DEATHS: A UTILITARIAN
PERSPECTIVE ON CARELESS DRIVING
John Clennan *
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the last twenty years, politicians, developers, business
leaders, academics, and environmentalists have formed coalitions to
encourage transit-oriented development. 1 Proponents of transitoriented development argue that jurisdictions need to enact land-use
reform to mitigate the damage of suburban sprawl. 2
On Long Island, transit-oriented development is big business.
With the goals of reducing pollution and car dependency, jurisdictions
grant smart growth developers tax breaks worth millions. 3 In most

* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2020; St. Joseph’s College,
B.S. in Business Administration and Social Science, minor in History and American Studies.
I want to give a special thanks to my family, friends, and coworkers for their support during
law school. I want to also thank Professor Lewyn for his advisement and guidance in
developing this topic. Next, I would like to express gratitude to Editor-in-Chief, Nicholas
Maggio, Managing Editor, Olivia Lattanza, and Professor Seplowitz for fast-tracking the
publication of this note. Finally, I dedicate this note to the memory of Katlin R. Catalano.
1 See 2020 Board of Directors, VISION LONG ISLAND, http://visionlongisland.org/boardmembers/ (Last visited May 12, 2020) (Vision Long Island is a smart growth advocacy
organization comprised of business and community leaders.)
2 Edward J. Sullivan & Jessica Yeh, Smart Growth: State Strategies in Managing Sprawl, 45
URB. LAW. 349, 351 (2013).
3 Jurisdictions compete amongst each other by offering developers massive tax breaks. See
Rachel O'Brien, Tritec Granted $28.6 Million Tax Break For Lindenhurst Residences,
NEWSDAY (Dec. 12, 2018 4:30 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/triteclindenhurst-residences-tax-break-1.24484049; see also Denise M. Bonilla, Residents Decry
Tax Breaks Approved For Wyandanch Building, NEWSDAY (Mar. 2, 2020 5:05 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/babylon-wyandanch-rising-tax-breaks1.42373714; see also Rachel O'Brien, Tax Deal Would Make Way For 12 Apartments, Family
Dollar Store In Copiague, NEWSDAY (Jan. 7, 2019 4:05 PM), https://www.newsday.com/longisland/suffolk/darius-masonry-copiague-tax-deal-1.25658821 (“A planned mixed-use
building in the heart of downtown Copiague may get an almost 50 percent tax abatement. . .
.”).
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cases, the new development rejuvenates a historic downtown. 4 Once
abandoned and blighted downtowns can turn into hip nightlife spots. 5
However, in the suburbs, transit-oriented development does not
necessarily reduce car dependency. 6 In New York, the “Patchogue
revival” is “recognized as a model for transit-oriented development
and a success story for smart growth on Long Island.” 7 However,
without parking, the Patchogue transit-oriented development miracle
would not have been possible. 8 While improved downtowns lead to
people walking between bars and restaurants, transit-oriented
development does not necessarily lead to using mass transit. Instead,
as evident by the need for more parking, new development, even under
the guise of transit-oriented development—does not necessarily reduce
car dependency. 9 To this end, Politicians have bemoaned that lack of
parking is merely a “growing pain” of transit-oriented development. 10
The Village of Patchogue, “Long Island’s model for transitoriented development,” 11 placed a moratorium on new businesses until
the Village can establish more parking. 12 However, instead of
evaluating road safety, politicians are focusing on expanding

See Michael Dobie, Dobie: Patchogue Comes Back to Life, With Lessons for All of Us,
NEWSDAY (Jun. 27, 2014 2:35 PM), https://www.newsday.com/opinion/columnists/michaeldobie/patchogue-comes-back-to-life-with-lessons-for-all-of-us-michael-dobie-1.8592159.
5 Id.
6 See Dena Belzer & Gerald Autler, Countering Sprawl with Transit-Oriented Development,
ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 19, No. 1, at 51-58 (Fall 2002).
7 LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE REVITALIZATION,
ECONOMIC
IMPACT
ANALYSIS,
5
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://lirpc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Long-Island-RPC-Village-of-Patchogue-Impact-Study12.19.18.pdf.
8 “[T]he installation of four municipal public parking lots on the corners of the Village were
important, allowing the growing number of visitors to the downtown easier access to its
businesses and events.” Id. at 44.
9 Nicole Fuentes, Patchogue Village Looks to Ban New Bars/Restaurants Until More Parking
Acquired, LONG ISLAND ADVANCE (Jan. 13, 2020 6:30 PM),
http://www.longislandadvance.net/stories/patchogue-village-looks-to-ban-newbarsrestaurants-until-more-parking-acquired,85078.
10 The Nassau County executive awarded grants to villages and towns so that they can “address
growing pains of recent TOD development - from parking concerns, to traffic issues, to
improvements to pedestrian safety.” Curran Expands Efforts to Advance Transit Oriented
Development Projects, NASSAU COUNTY, NEW YORK (Sep. 17, 2019)
https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=7546.
11 See LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 7.
12 “Our restaurants have been a key foundation to our downtown renaissance, but that comes
with a cost to the Village in the form of parking and public safety.” Fuentes, supra note 13.
4
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parking. 13 Even more ironically, on Long Island, at the of the dawn of
transit-oriented development, Suffolk and Nassau County slashed
funding to mass transit and reduced service. 14 In 2016, Suffolk County
made deep cuts to mass transportation. 15
Despite advocating for transit-oriented development,
politicians have mostly paid lip service to public transportation. 16 In
2018, the Suffolk County Executive drove to his “car free day”
celebration. 17 Nonetheless, at the celebration, which the County
Executive hosted near a train station, he promised to make
improvements to the county bus system. 18 As various taxing
jurisdictions grant generous benefits to transit-oriented development,
the county agreed to move bus stops out of downtowns and away from
train stations. 19 Spending money to encourage development around
transportation hubs while slashing mass transportation could make
13 “We need to come up with another 600 or 700 spaces.” Carl MacGowan, Patchogue Hires
Consultant to Aid in Finding Downtown Parking, NEWSDAY (Mar. 30, 2020 2:07 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/patchogue-downtown-parking-1.43457975;
see also Lon Cohen, Patchogue's Parking Garage Plans Getting $625K Boost from Suffolk
County, GREATER LONG ISLAND (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://patchogue.greaterlongisland.com/2019/10/16/patchogues-parking-garage-plansgetting-625k-boost-from-suffolk-county/.
14 See Alfonso A. Castillo, Suffolk County Will Cut 9 Bus Routes in October, Officials Say,
NEWSDAY (Aug. 4, 2016 11:44 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/suffolkcounty-may-cut-9-bus-routes-in-october-officials-say-1.12132709; see also Alfonso A.
Castillo, Groups Oppose MTA's Plan to Yank Funding for LI Bus, NEWSDAY (Jul. 23, 2010
10:00 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/groups-oppose-mta-s-plan-toyank-funding-for-li-bus-1.2134966.
15 Suffolk County eliminated nine bus routes that connected 400 people to downtowns, train
stations, town halls, colleges, hospitals, medical centers, and a retirement home for veterans.
Castillo, supra note 18; see also S71 Shirley to Stony Brook Railroad, SUFFOLK COUNTY
TRANSIT (Apr. 1, 2015) archived at https://studylib.net/doc/8749864/map-s71---suffolkcounty-transit.
16 On Long Island, Republican and Democrat politicians have run on platforms that encourage
smart transit-oriented development.
Dan O'Regan, Bellone, Mangano Focus on
Transportation, Transit-Oriented Development, LONG ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS
(Mar. 19, 2014), https://libn.com/2014/03/19/bellone-mangano-focus-on-transportationtransit-oriented-development/.
17 “Bellone, who said he did not abandon his vehicle but went ‘car-light’ on Friday by not
using his car as much as he normally would. . . .” Denise M. Bonilla, On Car Free Day,
Bellone Unveils Smartphone App for Bus Riders, Details Bike-Share Program, NEWSDAY
(Sep. 21, 2018 7:49 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/suffolk-bike-share1.21194187.
18 Id.
19 Riverhead Town has successfully lobbied Suffolk County to move its bus stops away from
a train station. The move is to facilitate leasing the former station building to a private coffee
shop. Denise Civiletti, Supe: Hampton Coffee Co. To Open at Riverhead Train Station,
RIVERHEADLOCAL (Jun. 26, 2019 12:19 PM),
https://riverheadlocal.com/2019/06/26/hampton-coffee-to-open-at-riverhead-train-station/.
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good fodder for a political comedian. However, stakeholders are
encouraging people to walk as pedestrian death tolls are rising. 20 In
particular, pedestrian deaths on Long Island are some of the highest in
the United States. 21 Smart Growth America placed three out of the
four congressional districts on Long Island on its list for the deadliest
congressional districts for pedestrian traffic. 22
To combat pedestrian deaths, local governments mostly focus
on making improvements to education, enforcement, and
infrastructure—when funds are available. 23 However, enforcement is
controversial, and some jurisdictions merely focus on citing
pedestrians. 24 In Florida, the Duval County Sheriff’s Office prides
itself on its pedestrian traffic enforcement. 25 Between 2012 to 2016,
the Duval County Sheriff’s Office utilized twenty-eight separate
statutes to issue 2,200 tickets to pedestrians. 26 Likewise, in Georgia, a
jury convicted a mother—who did not even own a vehicle—of
homicide by vehicle. 27 The mother was “jaywalking” across a fiveIn 2018 pedestrian deaths reached a twenty-seven-year high and continued to increase.
Fatality Facts 2018: Pedestrians, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY,
https://www.iihs.org/topics/fatality-statistics/detail/pedestrians#fn1ref1 (last visited May 13,
2020); Colin Beresford, Pedestrian Deaths in 2019 Were Highest in 30 Years, Report Says,
CAR AND DRIVER (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a31136893/pedestrian-deaths-increase-2019/.
21 Most Deadly U.S. House Districts: Dangerous by Design, SMART GROWTH AMERICA (Jul.
2019),
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/app/uploads/2019/07/DBD-2019-CongressionalDistricts.pdf.
22 Id.
23 Education includes so-called “See and be Seen” programs. In “See and be Seen programs,”
police issue warning cards to pedestrians and place educational postings at bus stops.
Municipalities improve road safety by reconstructing crosswalks, reducing traffic speeds, and
building sidewalks. Under targeted enforcement, police officers carry out “blitzes” where they
ticket drivers and pedestrians. See Richard Retting, Pedestrian Traffic Fatalities by State,
GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION, Feb. 2020, at 39-40,
https://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/GHSA-Pedestrian-Spotlight-FINALrev2.pdf.
24 See Topher Sanders et al., Walking While Black, PROPUBLICA & FLORIDA TIMES UNION
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/walking-while-black/jacksonville-pedestrianviolations-racial-profiling/.
25 The Duval County Sherriff’s Office claims that pedestrian tickets are a useful tool to stop
suspicious people. Furthermore, issuing pedestrian tickets will deter people from illegally
crossing the street and reduce traffic accidents. See id.
26 Id.
27 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020):
Any person who causes the death of another person, without an intention
to do so, by violating any provision of this title . . . commits the offense of
homicide by vehicle in the second degree when such violation is the cause
20
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lane road with her children when a habitually intoxicated driver struck
her family. 28
In the Georgia case, the mother was trying to cross the road to
reach her apartment building from a bus stop. 29 The nearest crosswalk
involved walking over one-and-a-half miles. 30 Therefore, the mother
“jaywalked” across the road with her children. 31 The driver of the van
claimed the family “jumped out in front of [him]. 32 The driver also
claimed that he “thought that he had only hit a basket and a post on the
side of the road.” 33 The driver did not stop. 34 Regardless, investigators
claimed the accident occurred because the mother “led” her son “into
the roadway under unsafe conditions.” 35 The case caused a media
frenzy; nonetheless, nearly ten years after the accident, there is still not
a crosswalk from the bus stop to the apartment building. 36
However, the climate is changing, and some jurisdictions are
prosecuting drivers who unintentionally cause pedestrian fatalities. 37
In 2012, New Jersey amended its vehicular homicide statute to include
death caused by a distracted driver using a cellphone. 38 In 2017 the
New Jersey statute came to national prominence when Monmouth
of said death and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided
in Code Section 17-10-3.

Id.
28 A jury convicted the mother of second-degree vehicular homicide. The court granted the
mother a new trial. Before the new trial, the State allowed the mother to plea to the
“jaywalking” charge and dropped the homicide charge. See Nelson v. State, 31 S.E.2d 770
(Ga. 2012); see also Marcus K. Garner, Homicide Charge Dropped Against Jaywalking Cobb
Mom, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (June 13, 2013),
https://www.ajc.com/news/crime--law/homicide-charge-dropped-against-jaywalking-cobbmom/0Nane3VdTqDe5NvUSLIn2H/.
29 David Goldberg, Protect, Don’t Prosecute, Pedestrians, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Aug.
4,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/protect-dont-prosecutepedestrians/2011/07/28/gIQAny45uI_story.html.
30 Id.
31 Nelson v. State, 731 S.E.2d 770, 773 (Ga. 2012).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 774.
36
Austell Rd + Austell Circle Bus Stop ID: 920247, GOOGLE MAPS,
https://www.google.com/maps (then search for Austell Rd + Austell Circle) (last visited May
13, 2020).
37 See Nate Schweber & Tracey Tully, She Texted About Dinner While Driving. Then A
Pedestrian Was Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/nyregion/texting-driving-vehicular-homicide-nj.html.
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (2012) (“Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held
wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c. 310
(C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.”
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County prosecutors secured an indictment against a driver who caused
the death of a pedestrian. 39 The driver declined to take a plea that
would have resulted in a sentence of three-to-five years. 40 Instead, the
driver went to trial, and a jury of her peers came back with a
conviction. 41 The driver is currently awaiting sentencing. 42
As the suburbs increase density to encourage growth,
pedestrian safety must become paramount. Therefore, the purpose of
this note is to analyze potential criminal penalties under current New
York Law for motor vehicle accidents that result in pedestrian deaths.
Furthermore, this note will make recommendations as to how the New
York State Legislature can reform existing laws to penalize drivers
who carelessly cause the death of a pedestrian. To that end, criminal
penalties for careless driving are significant because penalties can
deter other careless drivers.
In this note, Part II will explain the theory behind using
criminal punishment to deter subsequent criminal conduct. Part III
will discuss the evolution of current New York criminal statutes as
applied to careless driving that causes death. Part IV will compare how
New Jersey and Georgia penalize careless driving that results in the
loss of life. Finally, Part V will explain why New York needs to reform
or enact new statues to deter careless driving.
II.

DETERRENCE

Proponents of utilitarian punishment believe that punishment
must result in the reduction of future crime. 43 Under utilitarian
punishment, a judge must consider the deterrent value in imposing
punishment. 44 There are two considerations to deterrence: individual
and general. 45 Preventing recidivism is the primary focus behind an
individual or specific deterrence. 46 This note focuses on general
deterrence as a method to improve road safety.
See Schweber, supra note 37.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Meg Oliver, New Jersey Woman Faces 10 Years in Prison for Deadly Texting While Driving
Case, CBS NEWS (November 26, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/newjersey-woman-faces-10-years-in-prison-for-deadly-texting-while-driving-case-2019-11-26/.
43 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14 (7TH ED. 2015).
44 People v. McConnell, 402 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1980).
45 DRESSLER, supra note 43.
46 Id. at 16.
39
40
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Under the theory of general deterrence, a judge imposes a
reasonable sentence that deters subsequent people from committing
similar criminal conduct. 47 Utilitarians premise general deterrence on
the theory that potential offenders will see the impact of the
punishment that society extends to individual conduct and, therefore,
will avoid participating in similar conduct. 48 Some utilitarianists think
that punishment absent a deterrence value is fundamentally unfair. 49
In part, New York enacted its Penal Law to:
[P]roscribe unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests;. . . [t]o provide for an appropriate public
response to particular offenses, including consideration
of the consequences of the offense for the victim,
including the victim’s family, and the community; and
[t]o insure the public safety by preventing the
commission of offenses through the deterrent influence
of the sentences authorized. . . . 50
Thus, in enacting the Penal Law, the Legislature recognized general
deterrence is a crucial aspect of sentencing in New York. 51
In People v. Suitte, 52 the Second Department noted that
“deterrence is [a] primary and essential postulate of almost all criminal
law systems.” 53 Moreover, at sentencing, “the judge may look beyond
the offender to the presumed effect of the sentence on others.” 54
However, there are several reasons why general deterrence is
controversial. First, in a high publicity case, the accused can face
47 Daniel M. Farrell, Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General
Deterrence, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2015).
48 Major Owen Basham, General Deterrence Arguments (an Excursion Ticket, Good for This
Day and Trip Only), THE ARMY LAWYER (April 1979), at 5 (Major Basham’s article is a
critique on military law as applied to general deterrence. However, Major Basham includes a
good analysis of the philosophy behind general deterrence.).
49 Gabriel v. Brame, 28 So. 2d 581, 582–83 (Miss. 1947):
“Two propositions are fundamental, as we think, the first of which is that
punishment for crime has its basis solely in its effect as a deterrent as
against future offenses-that punishment for the sake of punishment, or for
vengeance alone, has no place in the processes of human tribunals. And
as a deterrent, a present offender is as much within the object as others in
general.”
Id.
50 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(1), (5), (6) (McKinney 2019) (emphasis added).
51 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05.
52 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982).
53 Id. at 680
54 Id. (citing United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974)).
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unusually harsh punishments for the sake of the deterrent value. 55
Second, opponents of utilitarianism argue that it is fundamentally
unfair to publicly humiliate the accused for the sake of deterring future
crime. 56 In essence, opponents of general deterrence contend that
society is immorally using the accused by making an example out of
her. 57 Finally, opponents of general deterrence claim it is a logical
fallacy to assume people act rationally. 58 Opponents further argue that
certain crimes may be immune to general deterrence. 59 Specifically,
people who suffer from compulsive behavior (such as substance abuse)
or commit crimes of passion do not rationally decide to commit a crime
or participate in reckless behavior.
The opponents’ arguments are not without merit. First, under
the utilitarian view, the punishment in a high-profile case should shock
the public conscience. 60 Therefore, if a case has, for some reason,
attracted great publicity, a severe sentence could be expected to have
a significant deterrent effect. 61 For punishment to have a general
deterrence effect, community awareness and media attention are
necessary. 62 If the public is not aware, then the rational person cannot
take notice and alter her behavior. 63 Second, proponents of general
deterrence argue that it is not immoral, nor is society using the

Opponents further argue that a harsh sentence in the name of general deterrence does not
enhance deterrence. See Mirko Bagaric & Peter Isham, A Rational Approach to the Role of
Publicity and Condemnation in the Sentencing of Offenders, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 275
(2019).
56 See id.
57 See Daniel M. Farrell, Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General
Deterrence, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2015).
58 Under the rational approach an actor makes a cost benefit analysis before engaging in
reckless or intentional conduct that can lead to punishment. See William L. Barnes, Jr.,
Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing A Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and
Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 640 (1999).
59 See Johannes Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses, 38 CHI. U. L. REV. 3 (1971).
60 “If the sentencing judge wishes to attach weight to the general preventive effect of a
particular sentence, he should consider the publicity which the decision will receive and the
possible reactions of those people who will hear or read about the decision.” Johannes
Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 CHI. U. L. REV. 649, 656 (1970).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.:
If, on the other hand, the publicity is minimal and the sentence probably
will be known only to the defendant himself and the officials involved with
the case, the judge could let the offender off with a light sentence without
sacrificing any general preventive effects.
Id.
55
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accused. 64 Instead, some criminal law theorists argue that the accused
owes a duty to the victim to prevent future wrongdoing. 65 Finally, the
opponents are correct; utilitarianism will not prevent crimes of passion
or compulsive behavior. However, unintentional death due to careless
driving is not necessarily a result of compulsive behavior or a crime of
passion.
III.

EXISTING NEW YORK STATUTES

Currently, New York does not have a vehicular homicide
statute that is as broad as the Georgia 66 or New Jersey 67 statutes. 68 The
New York vehicular homicide statute is limited to cases that concern
intoxication, transporting hazardous materials, and driving a
snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle while intoxicated. 69 Absent
See Farrell, supra note 57.
“The accused owes a duty to the victim of future protection.” See VICTOR TADROS, THE
ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 276 (Sep. 15, 2011).
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020).
67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (2020).
68 Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 2019), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West
2020), and GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020).
69 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 2019):
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he
or she causes the death of another person, and either: (1) operates a motor
vehicle . . . or operates a vessel or public vessel . . . and as a result of such
intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined
influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor
vehicle, vessel or public vessel in a manner that causes the death of such
other person, or (2) operates a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight
rating of more than eighteen thousand pounds which contains flammable
gas, radioactive materials or explosives . . . and such flammable gas,
radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such death, and as a
result of such impairment by the use of alcohol, operates such motor
vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person, or (3)
operates a snowmobile . . . or operates an all terrain vehicle . . . and as a
result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the
combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates
such snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that causes the death of
such other person. If it is established that the person operating such motor
vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle caused
such death while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol
or a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of
such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the
combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such
person operated the motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or
all terrain vehicle in a manner that caused such death, as required by this
section.
Id.
64
65
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intoxication and depending on circumstances, prosecutors can
currently charge a careless driver who kills a pedestrian, with reckless
driving, 70 reckless endangerment, 71 criminally negligent homicide, 72
and second-degree manslaughter. 73 Reckless driving falls under the
Vehicle and Traffic Code; whereas, Reckless Endangerment,
Criminally Negligent Homicide, and Manslaughter fall under the Penal
Law. 74
However, the issue with recklessness and criminal negligence
is that both levels of culpability require more than merely breaking the
Vehicle and Traffic Code—even if it results in death. As this note
demonstrates below, to prove criminal negligence or reckless
culpability, prosecutors need what has colloquially become known as
the “rule of two.” 75
The “rule of two” is the theory that prosecutors can only secure
a conviction for the death of a pedestrian if the driver violated two or
more traffic provisions. 76 Instead, prosecutors must show some
“moral blameworthiness.” 77 Mere traffic violations, even when it
results in tragic consequences, are not “moral blameworthy
conduct.” 78
A.

Recklessness

In New York, there are two statutes that the prosecution can
use against a driver who recklessly causes the death of a pedestrian. 79
The first statute is reckless driving. 80 The second statute is reckless
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2019).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 - 120.25 (McKinney 2019) (first- and second-degree Reckless
Endangerment are not Homicide statutes).
72 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2019).
73 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2019).
74 C.f. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1212 (McKinney 2019); with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15
(McKinney 2019); and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 2019).
75 Brad Aaron, Is There Really a “Rule of Two”?, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 22, 2012),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2012/02/22/is-there-really-a-rule-of-two/.
76 “Vehicular-crime cases in New York are usually based on a driver’s committing at least two
traffic infractions, which prosecutors informally call ‘the rule of two.’ Speeding alone is
frequently insufficient to establish criminality.” J. David Goodman, Prosecutors Face Test
Proving Serious Crime in a Fatal Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/nyregion/serious-charges-in-fatal-crashes-posechallenge-for-prosecutors.html?pagewanted=all.
77 See People v. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008).
78 See id.
79 Infra notes 80, 81.
80 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2019).
70
71
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endangerment. 81 Under both statutes, the actor must commit reckless
culpable conduct. In New York, a person acts with reckless culpable
conduct when she:
[I]s aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that
such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. 82
The elements of reckless endangerment overlap with reckless driving.
However, under reckless driving, the accused must “unreasonably
interfere[] with the free and proper usage of a public highway or
unreasonably endanger[] users of the public highway.” 83
1.

Reckless Driving

In New York State a person recklessly drives when she uses
“any motor vehicle, motorcycle or any other vehicle propelled by any
power other than muscular power or any appliance or accessory thereof
in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use
of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public
highway.” 84 Furthermore, a person drives recklessly when she
unreasonably shows a disregard for the consequences of her driving. 85
The driver must show a reckless disregard for the consequences
of her driving, which interferes with the use of a public roadway.86
Breaking other rules of the road, such as speeding, is not enough to
warrant a reckless driving conviction. 87 Furthermore, an accident—
without something more—can not lead to an inference that a driver
drove recklessly. 88 Likewise, mere negligence is not reckless
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 – 120.25 (McKinney 2019).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney 2019).
83 The People’s failure to prove reckless endangerment does not necessarily foreclose a
conviction of reckless driving. The People could prove reckless driving because an element
of reckless driving is interfering with use of a public highway. People v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d
565, 569 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016).
84 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2019).
85 People v. Grogan, 183 N.E. 273, 275 (N.Y. 1932); People v. Armlin, 160 N.E.2d 478, 479
(N.Y. 1959).
86 Grogan, 183 N.E. at 277; People v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 565, 569 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016).
87 Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d at 568-69.
88 The occurrence of an accident does not automatically lead the inference that the Accused
drove recklessly. People v. Blakeslee, 15 N.Y.S.3d 638, 644 (Tompkins Cty. Ct. 2019).
81
82
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driving. 89 The reckless driving statute focuses on the accused’s
conduct. 90 For a guilty conviction, the accused must display “wilful
or wanton disregard of the rights of others.” 91
In People v. Smith, 92 the court found that the accused did not
commit criminal conduct because she was not “intoxicated or impaired
. . . [and] did not speed or disobey traffic signals. 93 Instead, the
defendant looked away to make a turn and did not look back to check
for a pedestrian. 94 For the People to win a proper conviction for
reckless driving, the People must prove a multitude of factors. The
court needs to analyze all of the accused’s actions leading up to the
accident. 95 In People v. Goldblatt, 96 the court found that the jury could
use the facts that the accused was speeding, disregarding traffic signs,
intoxicated, and swerving to infer that he drove recklessly. 97
Reckless driving is more than one action that results in death.
Instead, a court must look at all of the driver’s conduct. Thus, multiple
instances of negligent conduct can lead to the inference that the driver
drove recklessly.
2.

Reckless Endangerment

In New York, a person is guilty of second-degree reckless
endangerment “when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates
a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.” 98 Firstdegree reckless endangerment requires “depraved indifference to

Civil negligence is not the same as criminal negligence. Even in a reckless driving charge
the People must prove more than mere negligence. The People must show the accused had
culpability. Merely driving through a stop sign does not create culpable negligence. People
v. Garo, 144 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (Broome Cty. Ct. 1955).
90 In re Vincent H., 775 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004), aff'd, 790 N.Y.S.2d 890
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005) (the case was in family court because the accused was a juvenile).
91 People v. Smith, 90 N.Y.S.3d 800, 803 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2018) (the unwise decision of
the Accused that resulted in the Accused fatally striking a pedestrian did not rise to the level
of criminal conduct. “Defendant was not intoxicated or impaired; she did not speed or disobey
traffic signals; she checked her rear view and driver's side mirrors before executing the turn;
and attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to stop the vehicle in the seconds after the collision and
avoid striking the pedestrian.”).
92 See generally 90 N.Y.S.3d 800 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2018).
93 Id. at 803.
94 Id.
95 See People v. Goldblatt, 950 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212-15 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012).
96 950 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012).
97 Id. at 213.
98 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 2019).
89
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human life.” 99 Depraved indifference involves “an utter disregard for
the value of human life.” 100 Voluntary intoxication is not a defense of
reckless conduct. 101
Reckless endangerment requires that the accused act with a
“heightened sense of awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
. . .” 102 Next, the People must prove that a reasonable person could
foresee that the accused’s conduct would result in the harm or risk of
the harm alleged. 103 Second, the accused’s conduct must cause the risk
of physical harm. 104 When combined, a multitude of actions can rise
to the culpable level of recklessness that constitutes reckless
endangerment. 105 Speeding alone may not constitute reckless
conduct. 106 However, speeding combined with driving the wrong way,
and ignoring traffic signals can constitute reckless conduct. 107
In People v. King, 108 a police officer, while driving down a
road, allegedly opened his vehicle door. The vehicle door knocked
into a cyclist and the cyclist’s passenger. 109 The vehicle door
“propelled” the bicycle, cyclist, and the cyclist’s passenger into a
nearby pedestrian. 110 Then, the police officer closed the vehicle door
and allegedly sped off. 111 The officer did not come forward; however,
he purportedly admitted to his partner that he opened the vehicle door
because the cyclist cursed at him. 112 On appeal, the court upheld the
verdict of reckless endangerment because a jury could infer reckless
conduct because he told his partner that he hit the cyclist, and he did
not stop to render aid. 113 However, currently, with the “rule of two,”

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2019).
People v. Wilson, 109 N.E.3d 542 (N.Y. 2018) (quoting People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d
1163, 1173 (N.Y. 2006)).
101 Id.
102 People v. Reagan, 683 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (App. Div. 2d 1998).
103 People v. Roth, 604 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1992) (“For purposes of criminal liability, it was
not enough to show that, given the variety of dangerous conditions existing at the site, an
explosion was foreseeable; instead the People were required to show that it was foreseeable
that the explosion would occur in the manner that it did.”).
104 People v. Beam, 866 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008).
105 See People v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 565 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016).
106 Id. at 558-69.
107 Id.
108 529 N.Y.S.2d 172 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988).
109 Id. at 173
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 173-74.
99

100
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it is unlikely that a driver who “doors” a pedestrian would face any
charges, let alone reckless endangerment. 114
First-degree reckless endangerment is outside the scope of this
note. Nevertheless, to sustain a conviction of first-degree reckless
endangerment, the People need to prove something more than a
careless operation that results in loss of life. 115 Generally, evidence
that the accused participated in other crimes, such as driving while
intoxicated, 116 fleeing from the police, 117 or participating in a fight 118
can demonstrate a “depraved indifference to human life.” 119
B.

Negligent Homicide

Conduct, an act or omission 120 that causes the death of another
person, is homicide. 121 Criminal negligence is a level of criminal
culpability where a person:
[F]ails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such result will occur or that such circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation. 122
In New York, criminally negligent homicide 123 and second-degree
manslaughter 124 require the culpability of criminal negligence.
Nevertheless, not every act of carelessness constitutes criminal

In 2012, an unlicensed driver caused the death of pedestrian when he alleged struck a cyclist
with the door of his vehicle. The force of the door caused the cyclist into the path of a bus.
Brad Aaron, Is There Really a “Rule of Two”? STREETS BLOG NYC (Feb. 22, 2012),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2012/02/22/is-there-really-a-rule-of-two/.
115 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2019).
116 See People v. Davis, 576 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1991) (During a blizzard, the
accused drove a snowmobile on a public highway while under the influence of marijuana, and
cocaine. The accused struck someone and left the person in the road. Leaving the victim in
the road helpless supported the accused’s conviction).
117 See People v. Kenney, 733 N.Y.S.2d 124 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001).
118 See People v. Saunders, 613 N.Y.S.2d 386 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994).
119 Id.
120 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00(4) (McKinney 2019).
121 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2019).
122 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (McKinney 2019).
123 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2019).
124 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2019)
114
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negligence. 125 Criminal negligence requires a higher level of
culpability than mere civil negligence. 126
The Accused must have a severe level of blameworthiness for
the conduct that resulted in the death of a victim. 127 A string of
unfortunate events may not rise to the level of criminal negligence.128
Nevertheless, the accused’s state of mind is the difference between
criminally negligent homicide and second-degree manslaughter. 129
State of mind is determined:
[E]ntirely on the circumstances of the particular
conduct. Whether in those circumstances the act or acts
causing death involved a substantial and unjustifiable
risk, and whether the failure to perceive it was such as
to constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care
which a reasonable man would have observed under the
same circumstances. . . . 130
Therefore, under criminally negligent homicide, the accused is not
aware of the risk. 131 Instead, under criminally negligent homicide, the
accused “failed to perceive the risk in a situation where [he] has a legal
duty of awareness. 132 Whereas in second-degree manslaughter, the
accused appreciated the risk of harm but continued acting, and that
action resulted in death. 133

People v. Boutin, 555 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1990).
Id.
127 It is not enough that the elements of criminal negligence are met. Underlying conduct that
caused death is required as well. Id. at 255.
128 See id.
129 “The essential distinction between the crimes of manslaughter, second degree, and
criminally negligent homicide is the mental state of the defendant at the time the crime was
committed.” People v. Stanfield, 330 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1975), overruled on other grounds
by People v. Glover, 439 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1982).
130 People v. Haney, 284 N.E.2d 564, 568 (N.Y. 1972).
131 See People v. Haney, 284 N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1972).
132 Id. at 567:
The present law [criminally negligent homicide] lacks the moral
implication of murder or manslaughter in the first or second degree, each
of which involves awareness of the harm which will (or in some degree
probably will) result from the offender's conduct. Criminally negligent
homicide, in essence, involves the failure to perceive the risk in a situation
where the offender has a legal duty of awareness. It, thus, serves to provide
an offense applicable to conduct which is obviously socially undesirable.
(citations omitted).
Id.
133 Id.
125
126

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 5

450

TOURO LAW REVIEW
1.

Vol. 36

Criminally Negligent Homicide

In New York, “[a] person is guilty of criminally negligent
homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of
another person.” 134 First, criminally negligent homicide does not
include every action of carelessness that results in someone’s death.135
Second, the elements require that the significance of the accused’s
wrongdoing violates the community’s sense of right and wrong. 136
Furthermore, under criminally negligent homicide, the accused does
not have to have a conscious awareness of her acts. 137 Therefore,
criminally negligent homicide requires a lower level of culpability than
reckless driving. 138
To sustain a conviction of criminally negligent homicide, the
People must prove that the accused’s actions are the direct result of the
victim’s death. 139 It is not enough that the accused set off a chain of
events that resulted in the victim’s death. 140 In People v. Ballenger, 141
the accused, a passenger in the vehicle, grabbed the vehicle’s steering
wheel and caused it to hit a guard rail. 142 Thirty minutes after the
accused allegedly caused the first accident, several other vehicle
accidents occurred. 143 Queued traffic due to lane closures caused by
the accused’s accident was the direct cause of the subsequent
accidents. 144 The court held that the accused could foresee that his
actions could cause lane closures; however, probable accidents caused
by possible lane closures were not criminal negligence. 145

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2019).
People v. Beiter, 432 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1980).
136 “[T]he elements of the crime ‘preclude the proper condemnation of inadvertent risk creation
unless’ the significance of the circumstances of fact would be apparent to one who shares the
community's general sense of right and wrong.” Id.
137 See Myers v. State, 667 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1013 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997).
138 It is interesting that reckless driving has a higher burden than some homicide statutes,
because reckless driving is in the Vehicle and Traffic Code, whereas the homicide statutes are
in the Penal Law. People v. Boice, 455 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1982).
139 See People v. Ballenger, 968 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013).
140 See generally id.
141 968 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013).
142 Id. at 611-12.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 612.
134
135
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In People v. McDermott, 146 the accused pulled a home-made
trailer behind his vehicle. 147 The accused did not license, nor register
his trailer. 148 At one point, the accused pulled into the median of an
interstate highway because he thought there was something wrong
with the trailer. 149 By pulling into the median, he disregarded highway
signage that forbids parking or making U-turns in the median—pulling
into the median of the interstate set off a chain of events that caused a
multicar accident that resulted in the death of another driver. 150 The
court held that the accused did not commit criminal negligence by
merely ignoring a road sign. 151 However, when tallied, the accused’s
actions—ignoring the sign, stopping in the median, pulling an
unlicensed trailer, the road conditions caused by heavy rain—proved
the accused had the culpability of criminal negligence. 152
People v. Haney 153 is one of the earliest examples of criminally
negligent homicide as applied to careless driving. In Haney, a driver
was speeding, ignored a stoplight, and ran over a pedestrian. 154 The
pedestrian had just exited from a bus and had the right of way. 155 The
driver struck the pedestrian in the crosswalk. 156 The force of the
accident flung the pedestrian over 100 feet away from the accident
site. 157 After hitting the pedestrian, the vehicle continued to go
forward until it crashed into a telephone pole. 158 When a police officer
placed the accused under arrest, the accused kept repeating that he
“didn’t mean to hit her.” 159 The court held that hitting a pedestrian
who has the right of way in a crosswalk may not arise to criminal
negligence. 160 Nevertheless, hitting the pedestrian in the crosswalk,
combined with excessive speed, clear vision, and ignoring a stoplight,
790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2005).
Brief for the Respondent at 3, People v. McDermott, 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t
2005) (No. 2004-00393), 2004 WL 3560170, at 3.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 McDermott, 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2005).
152 Id.; Brief for the Respondent at 3, People v. McDermott, 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d
Dep’t 2005) (No. 2004-00393), 2004 WL 3560170, at 3.
153 N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1972).
154 Id. at 565
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
146
147
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could lead a jury to the reasonable inference that the accused acted with
criminal negligence. 161
However, in a 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals may have
created the “rule of two” when it took the teeth out of criminal
negligence as it relates to careless driving. 162 In People v. Cabrera, 163
the court retreated from the standards set in Haney. 164 In Cabrera, the
accused drove his friends to a lake to go swimming. 165 The accused
violated the terms of his junior license by having more than two
underage people in his vehicle. 166 Moreover, the accused did not wear
his seatbelt, did not require his passengers to wear their seatbelts, and
was driving thirty miles per hour over the speed limit. 167 The accused
took a corner too fast, and the “vehicle went off the left-hand side of
the road, it slid down a 25–to–30–foot embankment.” 168
The crash killed two people in the accused’s vehicle. 169 The
court held that the accused’s carelessness in speeding was not enough
to uphold a verdict of criminally negligent homicide. 170 Instead, the
People needed to show that the driver committed an affirmative action
that “transform[s] ‘speeding’ into ‘dangerous speeding;’ conduct by
which the defendant exhibits the kind of ‘serious[ly] blameworth[y]’
carelessness whose ‘seriousness would be apparent to anyone who
shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.’” 171
Here, the majority distinguished Cabrera from Haney because
the accused in Haney caused the death of another person when he ran
a red-light signal while speeding. 172 In comparison, the accused, in
Cabrera, was merely speeding. 173 Therefore, in Cabrera, the majority
held that “a young and inexperienced but sober driver, [who] entered
a tricky downhill curve, . . . at a [high] rate of speed” did not commit
seriously blameworthy conduct when his careless driving caused the
death of three people. 174
Id. at 569.
See People v. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008).
163 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008).
164 Cf. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008), with Haney, N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1972).
165 Cabrera, 887 N.E. 2d at 1133.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1134.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1136.
171 Id. (quoting Boutin, 555 N.E.2d 253).
172 Id. at 1136-37.
173 Id. at 1138.
174 Id.
161
162
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Nevertheless, the dissenting judges noted that a jury could draw
the inference of criminal negligence. 175 The dissenting judges
compared the accused’s actions in Cabrera with the actions of the
accused in Haney. 176 First, the dissenters cited excessive speed.177
Next, the dissenters noted that the accused broke the conditions of his
junior driver’s license by having too many people in the vehicle.178
Finally, the dissenters pointed out that the accused further broke the
conditions of his junior license by not requiring all of the passengers
in the vehicle to wear a seatbelt. Therefore, like the Haney court, the
dissenters found that these actions together could lead the jury to infer
criminal negligence. 179
In 2015, the Third Department upheld a conviction of
criminally negligent homicide against a driver who killed a person who
was standing on her front yard. 180 In People v. Olsen, 181 a driver lost
control of her vehicle, on a country road, and went careening across a
front lawn, striking a bystander. Using the rule of two (without
mentioning it), the court upheld the conviction because, at the trial,
witnesses testified that the accused was using a cellphone, weaving in
and out of traffic, and passing vehicles. 182 Olsen distinguishes
Cabrera, because in Olsen the accused participated in overt conduct—
using the cellphone, and illegally passing vehicles—while speeding. 183
In comparison, in Cabrera, the driver merely sped. 184
Nevertheless, in 2018, the Second Department dismissed,
albeit weak charges, of criminally negligent homicide against a

Id. at 84 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
Id.
177 Id. at 82 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 83 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
180 People v. Olsen, 1 N.Y.S.3d 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
181 1 N.Y.S.3d 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
182 Id. at 558:
[W]e reject defendant's claim that her conduct was not sufficiently
blameworthy to support the criminally negligent homicide conviction and
conclude that her actions evinced ‘the kind of “seriously blameworthy”
carelessness whose “seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares
the community’s general sense of right and wrong. . . . [The] defendant
engaged in unsafe passing and drove in an erratic manner while looking at
her cell phone, which ultimately caused her to lose control of her vehicle
and fatally strike an innocent bystander. . . .
Id.
183 Id.
184 See Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008).
175
176
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limousine driver. 185 In People v. Pino, 186 a limousine driver
miscalculated a turn. 187 A pickup truck, driven by an intoxicated man,
broadsided the limousine, which caused the death of four
passengers. 188 The court held that the People, “did not establish ‘the
kind of seriously condemnatory behavior that the Legislature
envisioned when it defined “criminal negligence,” even though the
consequences here were fatal.’” 189 Here, the actions of the limousine
driver were negligent and tragic by not criminally negligent.
Again, in 2020, the Second Department upheld the “rule of
two,” when it invalidated a 2016 conviction against a man who caused
a three-vehicle accident on an upstate parkway. 190 The court held that
the People failed to “establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant ‘fail[ed] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk’
which caused the death” of another person. 191
At issue in People v. Deriva, 192 was whether the accused had
enough space to pass another vehicle. Here, similar to the other cases,
speed was a factor; however, quoting Cabrera, the court held that the
People failed to prove conduct other than carelessness. 193 In Deriva,
the accused miscalculated a lane change while speeding. 194 The court
held that a mere miscalculation does not “transform speeding into
dangerous speeding.” 195 Deriva distinguishes Olsen because, in
Olsen, the accused committed other affirmative acts such as using the
cellphone and weaving in and out of traffic. 196

People v. Pino, 78 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2018), leave to appeal denied, 111
N.E.3d 1121 (N.Y. 2018).
186 78 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2018), leave to appeal denied, 111 N.E.3d 1121
(N.Y. 2018).
187 Id. at 410.
188 Brief for the Respondent at 1, People v. Pino, 78 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2018)
(No. 2017-01048.) 2017 WL 10716689, at 1.
189 Pino, 78 N.Y.S.3d at 411 (quoting People v. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008))
(citations omitted).
190 People v. Derival, 181 A.D.3d 918 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020).
191 Id.
192 181 A.D.3d 918 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020).
193 “In cases concerning charges of criminally negligent homicide arising out of automobile
accidents involving excess rates of speed, ‘it takes some additional affirmative act by the
defendant to transform speeding into dangerous speeding.’” Id. (quoting People v. Cabrera,
887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008)) (citations omitted).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See Olsen, 1 N.Y.S.3d 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
185
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Second-Degree Manslaughter

A person is guilty of second-degree manslaughter when “[h]e
recklessly causes the death of another person.” 197 First, second-degree
manslaughter requires causation. 198
The accused’s criminal
negligence must cause the victim’s death. Second, the accused must
perceive the risk and consciously disregard it. 199 Therefore, in seconddegree manslaughter, knowledge of the risk is critical. 200
In People v. Taylor, 201 the accused failed to stop at a flashing
red traffic signal. The accused struck a vehicle, and as a result of the
accident, the driver of the other vehicle died. 202 The People presented
evidence that the accused drank several beers that night.203
Furthermore, at trial, a witness testified that he told the accused “that
if he did not slow down, he would kill somebody.” 204 However, on
appeal, the Third Department found too much time elapsed between
the statements about the accused’s driving and the accident. 205
Therefore, even when considering the totality of the accused’s
conduct—drinking, speeding, running traffic lights, and ignoring
comments to slow down—it did not rise to the level of criminal
negligence. 206

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 2019).
See People v. Raymond, 867 N.Y.S.2d 643 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2008).
199 “The crime of manslaughter in the second degree requires the People to establish that
defendant recklessly caused the death of another by creating and consciously disregarding a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.” People v. Hart, 698 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (App. Div.
3d Dep’t 1999).
200 People v. Kern, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4, 18 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989), aff'd, 554 N.E.2d 1235
(N.Y. 1990):
[I]f the defendant is aware of the risk of death and consciously disregards
it and the risk is of such a nature that disregard thereof is a gross deviation
of the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed
under those circumstances, he is guilty of reckless manslaughter in the
second degree if death results.
Id.
201 297 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1969).
202 Id. at 193.
203 Id. at 193-94.
204 Id. at 194.
205 The witness told the accused that his driving would “kill someone” three hours before the
accident. Id.
206 “To convict of manslaughter, second degree, under the circumstances, it would be
necessary to hold that the act of passing a red blinking traffic light without stopping was a
conscious disregard of a risk.” Id.
197
198

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 5

456

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

However, general familiarity with an area may lead to the
inference that a person consciously disregarded a known risk. 207 In
People v. Heinsohn, 208 the accused operated an unregistered vehicle at
a high rate of speed on a busy city road. To get around heavy traffic,
the accused allegedly maneuvered his vehicle into the median so that
he could overtake a work truck. 209 The maneuver caused the accused
to strike two people on a pedestrian refuge island. 210
At trial, the accused took the stand. 211 During crossexamination, the accused testified that he had a general familiarity with
the area. 212 The court held that “[t]he jury was properly permitted to
conclude that when the defendant, knowing that there was a safety
island ahead, pulled out from behind the van, leaving the traffic lanes
and crossing the dividing line, he consciously disregarded the
substantial risk that pedestrians would be standing on the island.”213
Therefore, a jury can make the inference that the accused had criminal
negligence because he had a general familiarity with the area and
drove at an excessive speed in an unregistered vehicle. 214
Generally, second-degree manslaughter can survive the “rule
of two” because, unlike criminally negligent homicide, the driver has
an awareness of the risk. In People v. Asaro, 215 the accused drove
double the posted speed limit on a windy country road. 216 At one point,
the accused stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road to “rev its
engine.” 217 Right after stopping, the accused rapidly accelerated and
crossed a double yellow line, which caused the accused to crash headon into another vehicle. 218 The impact of the crash caused the death of
See People v. Heinsohn, 459 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983), aff'd, 462 N.E.2d
145 (N.Y. 1984); see also People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1990) (an intervening cause
does not necessarily negate the accused’s criminally negligent conduct.).
208 459 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983).
209 Id.
210 Id.; A pedestrian refugee island is an elevated surface on a roadway. The refuge island
gives pedestrians a place to wait as they cross a wide road. Refuge islands are often found on
large roadways where a pedestrian cannot cross the road in one traffic light interval. See
HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION
(June
2018),
Pedestrian
Refuge,
FEDERAL
https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/ped_bike/step/docs/techSheet_PedRefugeIsland2018.pdf.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 330.
213 Id. at 331.
214People v. Heinsohn, 462 N.E.2d 145-46 (N.Y. 1984).
215 998 N.E.2d 810 (N.Y. 2013).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
207
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the other driver. 219 At the trial, a witness testified that the accused had
an awareness of the dangerous curve on the road because the witness
warned him. 220 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the accused
“consciously disregard[ed] the risk he created” when he “used a public
road as his personal drag strip to showcase the capabilities of his
modified sports car.” 221
IV.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

As mentioned above, other jurisdictions have tailored their
statutes to quantify specific types of negligent conduct as vehicular
manslaughter. Georgia casts a wide net; nearly any traffic infraction
can lead to a conviction of homicide by vehicle. 222 In contrast, New
Jersey periodically updates its vehicular homicide statute to include
new problematic conduct. 223
1.

Georgia’s Catch-All Model

Homicide by vehicle, in Georgia, is when a person violates the
Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law, and that violation causes the death of
another. 224 Homicide by vehicle in the first degree is when the accused
allegedly causes the death of another while fleeing from the police, 225
passing a stopped school bus, 226 recklessly driving, 227 driving under
the influence, 228 or leaves the scene of an accident. 229 First-degree
homicide by vehicle is a felony that can result in a sentence of three-

219
220

Id.

Id.
Id. at 814 (quoting People v. Heinsohn, 462 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1984):
“Later, just before the collision, Ligenzowski pleaded with defendant to
slow down because they were ‘about to make the turn.’ Taken together,
‘there was sufficient proof for the jury to find that defendant was aware of
and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his
actions would cause the death of another.’” (citations omitted).

221

Id.
See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020).
223 Cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-5 (West 2012),
and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-5 (West 2003).
224 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020).
225 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-395 (2020).
226 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-163 (2020).
227 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-390 (2020).
228 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391 (2020).
229 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020).
222
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to-fifteen years. 230 Any other offense of the Vehicle and Traffic code
that causes the death of another person is second-degree homicide by
vehicle. 231 Second-degree homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor that
carries a one-year maximum sentence. 232
Homicide by vehicle is a strict liability offense.233
Furthermore, the State does not need to prove specific intent to commit
the underlining Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law infraction.234
However, the State must prove that the accused’s conduct is the “legal
and proximate” cause of the victim’s death. 235 Therefore, if the
accused broke a traffic law and was the proximate cause of the victim’s
death, then she is guilty of homicide by vehicle.
2.

New Jersey’s Selective Approach

New Jersey’s reckless vehicular homicide statute is similar to
Sections 125.12, 125.13, and 125.14 of New York’s Penal Law.
However, in New York, the Legislature limited its vehicular homicide
statutes to accidents that concern alcohol consumption or the
transportation of hazardous materials. 236 By contrast, New Jersey did
not limit its reckless vehicular homicide statute to driving under the
influence. 237 Nonetheless, in New Jersey, some statutes address
homicide caused by driving a vehicle while intoxicated as a strict
liability offense. 238
Unlike New York’s statutes, New Jersey’s vehicular homicide
statute allow a jury to draw inferences about the accused’s conduct. In
New Jersey, proof that the accused did any of the proscribed types of
230

Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (c) (2020).
232 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3 (2020).
233 State v. Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d 50, 53 (Ga. 2012)
234 Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d at 53:
“A charge on accident is appropriate for this crime only when there is
evidence that the defendant did not voluntarily drive into the crosswalk
instead of stopping for a pedestrian who was located in the statutorily
protected area. At trial, Ogilvie did not dispute that she voluntarily drove
into the crosswalk and struck the child there. . . .”
Id.
235 McGrath v. State, 627 S.E.2d 866, 869 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
236 Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020), with N.Y. Penal Law § 125.12 - 125.14
(McKinney 2019).
237 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020).
238 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.3 (West 2020) (However, that statute is outside the purposes
of this note as this note concerns careless driving other than driving while intoxicated.).
231
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conduct “may give rise to an inference that the [the accused] was
driving recklessly.” 239 New Jersey made law lists such conduct as
using a cell phone, falling asleep while driving, driving without proper
sleep, or failure to maintain a lane a second-degree crime when such
conduct causes the death of another person. 240 A person found guilty
of second-degree reckless vehicular homicide can face a five-to-ten
year sentence. 241
However, if a person causes the death of another while driving
on school grounds, illegally driving through a school crossing, or
driving through an undesignated school crossing with the knowledge
that juveniles are present, that is a first-degree crime under the New
Jersey’s reckless vehicular homicide statute. 242 A person found guilty
of first-degree vehicular homicide can face a ten-to-twenty year
sentence. 243
V.

ANALYSIS

Stakeholders need to take action to correct dangerous road
conditions. It is crucial now because higher density development is
supposed to encourage people to walk to nearby businesses and
transportation stops. 244 However, at the same time—as evident by the
need for parking—higher density development does not necessarily
reduce car dependency. 245 Therefore, people who walk must still
contend with dangerous road conditional caused by careless drivers.
Moreover, the current methodology which focusses on educating
drivers and pedestrians about road safety is not enough. 246
A.

Regression

In the early twentieth century, a felony conviction carried
severe consequences; accordingly, judges were hesitant “to attach the
grave consequences of a felony conviction to results by mere
inadvertence or carelessness.” 247 Prior to the revised Penal Law, New
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020).
Id.
241 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (West 2020).
242 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020).
243 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (West 2020).
244 Sullivan, supra note 2.
245 LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL supra note 7.
246 Retting, supra note 23
247 CLACK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.13 (7th ed. 1967).
239
240
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York Courts defined criminal negligence as “a disregard of the
consequences which may ensue from the act, and indifference to the
rights of others.” 248 Therefore, to combat death caused by careless
conduct, legislatures enacted lesser statutes. 249
In New York, under the old Penal Law, the Legislature created
a vehicular homicide statute that criminalized reckless or negligent
conduct while operating a vehicle that resulted in another person’s
death. 250 However, the vehicular homicide statute did not include the
“failure to perceive” a risk associated with careless conduct. 251
Therefore, New York’s early vehicular homicide statute did not have
teeth because it still required that the accused consciously participate
in careless conduct, which resulted in death. 252
In the 1960s, 253 New York revised its Penal Code—it
eliminated vehicular homicide—and enacted statutes that comprised
reckless driving, reckless endangerment, vehicular manslaughter,
criminally negligent homicide, and second-degree manslaughter, 254
because of the courts’ reluctance to convict an accused of involuntary
manslaughter for causing death through careless driving. 255 Under the
revised Penal Law, the Legislature enacted criminally negligent
homicide to address “a wide spectrum of fatal conduct of both
omission and commission.” 256 Therefore, criminally negligent
homicide replaced New York’s old vehicular homicide statute and
carried a lesser burden of proof. 257
However, since the enactment of New York’s revised Penal
Law, the courts have chipped away at the effectiveness of using
See People v. Angelo, 159 N.E. 394, 396 (N.Y. 1927); see also Robert P. Fine & Gary M.
Cohen, Is Criminal Negligence a Defensible Basis for Penal Liability?, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 749,
753 (1967).
249 See CLARK, supra note 247.
250 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1053-a (repealed 1967) (“A person who operates or drives any
vehicle of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is
killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle resulting in death.”).
251 See Fine, supra note 248.
252 See CLARK, supra note 247.
253 The New York State Legislature ratified the Penal Law in 1965. The Penal Law came into
effect on September 1, 1967. See SIXTH INTERN REPORT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE (February 1,
1967) archived at
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d7df/7812c0b0cc91fe85ff84d7042b1efa1e64b8.pdf.
254 CLARK, supra note 247.
255 Id.
256 Hechtman, Practice Commentary, MCKINNEY’S CONS LAWS OF NY, Book 39, Penal Law
§ 125.10 (1975).
257 Id.
248
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criminal statutes to penalize careless drivers. The decision in Cabrera
reflects as much, and the Cabrera decision may be what caused the socalled “rule of two.” Trial courts are using Cabrera as a means to
dismiss homicide charges against careless drivers. 258 Cabrera had an
immediate chilling effect on using the criminally negligent homicide
statute to deter careless driving.
On September 5, 2008, three months after Cabrera, a Suffolk
County judge, dismissed charges of criminally negligent homicide
against a driver who caused the death of three people as a result of
speeding. 259 The accused was driving over eighty-seven miles-perhour in a fifty-five miles-per-hour zone. 260 The driver “dramatically”
pressed the brakes, which caused the vehicle to spin into oncoming
traffic. 261 A minivan traveling in the opposite direction—under the
posted speed limit—broadsided the accused’s vehicle. 262 The force of
the accident caused the death of two teenagers in the accused’s vehicle
and the death of the minivan driver’s son. 263
The county court judge held that while teenage death caused by
inexperience driving is tragic, it did not rise to the level of criminal
negligence. 264 Citing Cabrera, which the county court judge noted,
the facts were eerily similar. 265 The judge held that criminal
negligence required risk creation. 266 The judge reasoned that merely
speeding, even excess of thirty miles per hour, on a busy suburban
road, during rush hour, is not “blameworthy conduct,” which rises to
the level of risk creation that the Court of Appeals set in Cabrera. 267
Thus, the court acknowledged the “rule of two,” without explicitly
mentioning it.
Nevertheless, the accused “allegedly drove ‘in a manner which
unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public
highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway,’”
therefore, the county court judge did not dismiss the reckless driving
charge. 268 Consequently, for causing the death of three people, the
See People v. Badke, 865 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2008).
People v. Badke, 865 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2008).
260 Id. at 490-91.
261 Id. at 494.
262 Id. at 490-91.
263 Id. at 490.
264 Id. at 494.
265 Id. at 492
266 Id.
267 Id. at 494.
268 Id.
258
259
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driver pled guilty and received a thirty-day sentence and a revoked
driver’s license. 269
As noted above, despite transit-oriented development and
programs to improve road safety—pedestrian deaths are on the rise.
When the Court of Appeals decided Cabrera, it set the standards back
eighty years to a time where the courts did not want to find a careless
driver guilty of a felony. 270 For example, in the 1934 case of People
v. Grieco, 271 the Court of Appeals did not want to convict a driver who
caused the death of a person by driving intoxicated, of first-degree
manslaughter, which was a felony. The court wrote that “[t]he degree
of the crime cannot be fixed ‘by analyzing the constituent acts which,
in combination, make up the transaction, and viewing them
distributively. It is determined by the quality and purpose of the
transaction as a whole.” 272 Furthermore, the court held that it is
improper to take a misdemeanor Vehicle and Traffic Law violation that
is a crime against society and use it to prove a crime against a
person. 273 However, today prosecutor in Grieco could have used New
York’s alcohol-related vehicular homicide statutes.

Smithtown Teen Gets 30 Days for Crash That Killed 3, NEWS12 LONG ISLAND (Dec. 04,
2008 12:37 PM), http://longisland.news12.com/story/34765843/smithtown-teen-gets-30days-for-crash-that-killed-3.
270 See generally People v. Grieco, 193 N.E. 634, 635 (N.Y. 1934):
“The Vehicle and Traffic Law makes many offenses misdemeanors. If this
conviction should be sustained, every driver of an automobile, who, while
committing one of the offenses defined as a misdemeanor in that act,
accidentally causes the death of a person, will be guilty of the crime of
manslaughter in the first degree no matter how thoughtless or unintentional
the act.”
Id.
271 193 N.E. 634, 635 (N.Y. 1934).
272 Id. at 635.
273 Id.:
“A moment before the collision the defendant's conduct constituted a
crime, a misdemeanor against society, against law and order, and against
the people of the state. The commission of the misdemeanor in which he
was engaged was not one affecting the person or property of deceased or
of another. He had not seen the deceased and did not know that she was
present. The fact that his automobile struck her could not instantly change
his conduct so as to make it an act affecting the person of the deceased and
thereby make him liable for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.”
Id.
269
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Public Perception

It is also important to note that in 2009 when the court decided
Cabrera, accident fatalities, more specifically pedestrian fatalities,
were the lowest ever recorded in the nation’s history. 274 Ten years
since Cabrera, pedestrian deaths are as high as they were in the
1970s. 275 To that end, the public perception of pedestrian-involved
vehicle accidents can use an attitude check. Public perception is
important because, under a theory of general deterrence, the public
must take note of the unlawful conduct, and the punishment must
shock the public into avoiding similar conduct. 276
Generally, commentators on social media and news websites
voice anger and frustration towards dead pedestrians and get annoyed
that a driver’s day may get delayed. 277 Some posters question why
pedestrians use roads, “[t]his is sad. B[ut] why walk at night in [the]
rain. . . .” 278 Blaming walkers even extends to parking lots—where
one-out-of-four pedestrian deaths occur. 279 In a post about a pedestrian
who got struck and killed in a parking lot, one commenter wrote, “[s]o
sad but people fail to pay attention to cars in parking lots all the []
time!” 280

Retting, supra note 23, at 12.
Id.
276 Basham, supra note 48.
277 See “There is something wrong with these people. Nobody ever taught them how to walk
on the street?” Donald Grasso, Stringer News, FACEBOOK (Mar. 17, 2020, 7:38 PM)
(commenting on a post about a pedestrian struck by a vehicle); see also “I don’t know if it [is]
ignorance, []arrogance, []or just plain stupidity. []They walk and ride bicycles straight into
the path of a vehicle and expect them to stop on a dime. []And they’re usually all but invisible
because they wear dark colors. []Meanwhile the driver not only has their vehicle damaged
and their day delayed, []they have to live with the fact they killed someone even if it was
unintentional. []The roads are getting worse and worse because people don’t use common
sense.” Thomas F. Cullen Jr., Stringer News, FACEBOOK (Mar. 17, 2020, 8:36 PM)
(responding to Donald Grasso); see also “A law should be [e]nacted for [people] walking at
night [t]hat they should carry a flashlight or wear neon gear so that they could be seen easily.
So many stories I read where [people] are struck and killed walking in the dark.” Terry Ciulla,
Patch.com Homeless Man in Wheelchair Fatally Struck by Car: PD, FACEBOOK (Feb. 11, 2020
7:21 PM) (commenting on the death of 62-year-old man in a wheelchair who was struck by a
vehicle while crossing a road).
278 Matthew Savage, Stringer News, FACEBOOK (Dec. 24, 2017 12:07 AM)
https://www.facebook.com/pg/StringerNewsService/posts/?ref=page_internal.
279 Accardo, infra note 284; Chris Giarratana, How Safe Are Pedestrians in Local Parking
Lots, SAFETY RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.trafficsafetystore.com/blog/tips-for-enhancing-parking-lot-pedestrian-safety.
280 Anthony Accardo, Stringer News, FACEBOOK (May 21, 2019)
274
275
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Socioeconomic status can create a public perception of the
victim. 281
Socioeconomic status is apparent in enforcement,
improvements, and prosecution. Generally, pedestrians are dying at a
faster rate in more disadvantaged neighborhoods. 282 In some
jurisdictions, accidents that involve a pedestrian fatality are not “even
judged worth a traffic ticket.” 283 Commonly, suburban people view
commuting through the use of walking and mass transportation as tools
for the poor. 284 Therefore, prosecutors treat accidents that result in the
death of a pedestrian differently.
C.

General Deterrence and Public Perception

In some circumstances, prosecutors will bring a case because
of community pressure. 285 Whereas, in other circumstances, similar
cases might not even get the attention of the press, let alone a
prosecutor. 286 The two examples below, while anecdotal, demonstrate
the inequalities of prosecution. The first case concerns a youth from
an affluent neighborhood who died as a result of car-surfing. 287 The
second case concerns a middle-aged woman who was hit by a vehicle
and dragged some distance down the road in a lower-middle-income
Maciag, infra note 286.
Mike Maciag, Pedestrians Dying at Disproportionate Rates in America's Poorer
Neighborhoods, GOVERNING (Aug. 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justicesafety/gov-pedestrian-deaths-analysis.html:
“Select areas, typically downtowns and business districts, are often
targeted for improvements, it’s the less visible lower-income
neighborhoods where pedestrians are dying at the highest rates. It’s not
just an inner-city problem -- at least, not for long. As more low-income
residents are priced out of downtowns, and as poverty continues to rise in
less pedestrian-friendly suburban communities, higher pedestrian death
tolls could follow.”
Id.
283 Eric Roper, In Crashes That Kill Pedestrians, The Majority of Drivers Don't Face Charges,
STAR TRIBUNE (May 22, 2016 10:41 AM), https://www.startribune.com/in-crashes-that-killpedestrians-the-majority-of-drivers-don-t-face-charges/380345481/?refresh=true.
284 “Nowadays, many local politicians don't see transit as a vital transportation function —
instead, they think of it as a government aid program to help poor people who lack cars.”
Joseph Stromberg, The Real Reason American Public Transportation Is Such A Disaster, VOX
(Aug. 10, 2015, 5:49 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/8/10/9118199/public-transportationsubway-buses.
285 See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
321 (2002).
286 See Id.
287 See QuickFacts Cold Spring Harbor CDP, New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU
(Jul. 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/coldspringharborcdpnewyork.
281
282
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area. 288 Both incidents happened in the same jurisdiction within
months of each other.
1. Car-surfing Incident
On September 23, 2018, three youths solicited an Uber driver
into letting them surf on the roof of the driver’s vehicle. 289 That night,
the youths were using Uber to hop between different parties in Cold
Spring Harbor, an affluent suburban neighborhood. 290 During the last
trip home, the youths offered the driver $70 to allow them to carsurf. 291 At first, the driver refused, after pressuring the driver, the
youths persuaded him to let them car-surf in exchange for $40. 292
Two of the youths surfed on the Uber driver’s vehicle, as the
other youth filmed it to post on social media. 293 One youth fell off the
vehicle and suffered a head injury. 294 However, the victim did not seek
medical treatment and died in his sleep as a result of the head injury.295
Under a theory of general deterrence, the People prosecuted the Uber
driver. According to the District Attorney:
We have a culture right now where the mindset is, “How
can we outdo each other?” particularly among young
people on social media, and we often see the tragic
consequences of that. . . . A lot of young people think
they are invincible, and that’s something we need to
keep drilling in their heads — that this could happen to
anyone when you engage in this kind of conduct. 296
Therefore, here, the People sought to deter other youths from carsurfing, not necessarily dissuade other Uber drivers from allowing
customers to surf on their vehicles, but to use the publicity from
prosecuting the Uber driver to discourage car-surfing among youths.
288 QuickFacts Deer Park CDP, New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/deerparkcdpnewyork/PST045219.
289 Robert Brodsky, Parents Forgive Uber Driver Responsible for Son's 'Car Surfing' Death,
NEWSDAY (Feb. 14, 2020 6:06 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/carsurfing-uber-driver-sentencing-1.41829885.
290 Id.
291 Michael O'Keeffe, Uber Driver Charged with Manslaughter in Death of Car Surfer, Suffolk
Officials Say, NEWSDAY (Nov. 5, 2018 10:59 PM), https://www.newsday.com/longisland/crime/uber-car-surfing-manslaughter-1.22940332.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
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Ultimately, the Uber driver pled guilty to second-degree manslaughter
and received a sentence of ten-months’ time-served and five years of
probation. 297 Here, the People had a strong case for second-degree
manslaughter because the driver initially refused the request. Refusing
the request to allow the youths to car-surf could demonstrate a
conscious awareness of the risk.
2.

Vehicle Dragging Incident

In contrast, in the same jurisdiction and during the same year,
prosecutors only charged a delivery driver who hit and dragged a
pedestrian to her death with leaving the scene of an accident. 298 The
delivery driver was leaving his drop off at an auto parts store when he
hit two pedestrians. 299 The collision knocked the first pedestrian to the
ground. 300 However, the collision caused the delivery truck to suck
the second pedestrian into the wheel well. 301 The delivery driver
continued on his way, ignoring the screams of the pedestrian and
bystanders. 302 The delivery driver dragged the second pedestrian a
half-mile down the road “zigzagged and fishtailed” across the road
“before [the pedestrian’s] body became dislodged. . . .” 303
Witnesses claimed the driver got out of the delivery truck,
looked at the dead pedestrian, and drove away. 304 The police caught
the delivery driver at his next stop, and he allegedly told detectives that
he “didn’t think she was alive,” and stated that he “panicked, and
[needed] to get to [his] next job.” 305 Days after the accident, members
of the community said there were still “reddish-colored skid marks”
down the road. 306
Brodsky, supra note 293.
Andrew Smith, Sini: Autozone Delivery Driver May Face Increased Charges in Death of
Pedestrian, NEWSDAY (August 7, 2019 6:39 PM), https://www.newsday.com/longisland/crime/autozone-fatal-van-death-1.34748834.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. (quotes are statements made by the District Attorney to the press on the day of the
arraignment).
306 Donnell Hicks Indicted for Fatal Hit-And-Run; Funeral Held for East Quogue Woman,
THE SOUTHAMPTON PRESS (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.27east.com/southamptonpress/donnell-hicks-indicted-for-fatal-hit-and-run-funeral-held-for-east-quogue-woman1503938/.
297
298
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The People charged the delivery driver with leaving the scene
of an accident without reporting when there is an injury. 307 The
delivery driver pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident, and he
is currently awaiting sentencing. 308
Under current law, in the vehicle dragging incident,
prosecutors cannot sustain a conviction that requires either criminal
negligence or recklessness. First, criminal negligence does not apply
because the driver’s blameworthy conduct is the failure to see the
pedestrians. As stated in Pino and Deriva, miscalculation when
driving is not morally blameworthy conduct.
D.

Time to get rid of the “Rule of Two”

In Cabrera, the Court of Appeals gutted any severe
consequences of careless driving that causes death or severe harm.
Under current law, a prosecutor cannot convict a careless driver, let
alone a driver who causes death to others by excessively speeding.
Currently, the driver needs to commit an overt act beyond a minor
traffic offense, which then turns the driver’s negligent conduct into
something more significant than a mere traffic infraction.
Nevertheless, New York has a few possibilities to make the
consequences of killing a pedestrian severe.
First, New York can enact a catch-all statute like Georgia’s
homicide by vehicle statute. Under Georgia’s statute, anyone who
causes the death of a person as a result of breaking a traffic law can
face a homicide conviction. 309 However, there are downsides to
Complaint, People v. Hicks, 01296-2019 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2019); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 600 (McKinney 2019):
“Any person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or having cause to
know that personal injury has been caused to another person, due to an
incident involving the motor vehicle operated by such person shall, before
leaving the place where the said personal injury occurred, stop, exhibit his
or her license and insurance identification card for such vehicle, when such
card is required pursuant to articles six and eight of this chapter, and give
his or her name, residence, including street and street number, insurance
carrier and insurance identification information including but not limited
to the number and effective dates of said individual's insurance policy and
license number, to the injured party, if practical, and also to a police
officer, or in the event that no police officer is in the vicinity of the place
of said injury, then, he or she shall report said incident as soon as
physically able to the nearest police station or judicial officer.”
Id.
308 Appearances, People v. Hicks, 01296-2019 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2019).
309 See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020).
307
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Georgia’s statute. First, some people in Georgia find the State’s catchall statute too lenient. 310 Without aggravating factors, most deaths
caused by a driver’s traffic infractions fall under second-degree
homicide by vehicle. 311 The maximum penalty under second-degree
homicide by vehicle is one year. 312
Georgia’s first-degree homicide by vehicle statute does carry a
fifteen-year maximum sentence. 313 However, the driver must violate
specific sections of Georgia’s Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law. 314 For
instance, if a driver leaves the scene of a fatal accident, the State can
charge her with first-degree homicide by vehicle. 315 Therefore, if New
York had a statute similar to Georgia’s homicide by vehicle statute, the
driver in the vehicle dragging incident could have faced a three-tofifteen-year sentence.
People who advocate for reforming the Georgia statute would
like to see the list of proscribed conduct under first-degree homicide
by vehicle expanded. 316 Their argument may have merit; however, the
Georgia statute is a good one because it recognizes that a person who
causes the death of another—with a vehicle—caused a homicide. The
same cannot be said in New York, where the courts think the death of
a person caused by a driver is a tragedy—not culpable criminal
conduct. 317 However, in Georgia, if a driver sets off a chain of events
that causes a “tragedy,” the driver is branded as someone who
committed a homicide. That could have a general deterrence effect on
future careless drivers.
Second, New York can amend its vehicular homicide statutes
to include more conduct. Currently, New York limits charges of
vehicular homicide to accidents that involve intoxication or hazardous
materials. 318 However, states like New Jersey regularly update its
vehicular homicide statutes to include new problematic conduct that

310 See Tim Chitwood, How Can Homicide By Vehicle Be A Misdemeanor?, LEDGERENQUIRER (Mar. 2, 2017 6:15 PM), ledger-enquirer.com/news/local/article136029928.html.
311 See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020).
312 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3 (2020).
313 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (a), (b), (d) (2020).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Chitwood, supra note 314.
317 “[T]he Court must look to the conduct of the defendant which caused the accident in
determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to criminal negligence, not the results, no
matter how tragic those results.” Badke, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95.
318 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 - 125.14 (McKinney 2019).
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includes drowsy driving, falling asleep, using a handled device, failure
to maintain a lane while driving. 319
The limitations of the New Jersey Statute is that it enumerates
specific conduct. 320 However, the value in the New Jersey statute is
that it allows a jury to draw an inference that the accused acted with
criminal negligence if she committed any of the enumerated
conduct. 321 Another downside to the New Jersey statute is that it limits
conduct where the jury can draw an automatic inference. However,
the enumerated conduct does not foreclose a vehicular homicide
conviction. If the accused’s actions fall outside of the conduct that the
Legislature proscribes, a prosecutor can still secure a vehicular
homicide conviction if she can prove that operator drove recklessly. 322
VI.

CONCLUSION

If the Legislature is serious about transit-oriented development
and curtailing car dependency, it must enact new statutes that
recognize the seriousness of careless driving. Currently, in the United
States, New York ranks at the top of people who walk and use public
transportation to commute to work. 323 Therefore, it is shocking that
New York lacks hard consequences for negligent conduct that results
in the death of a pedestrian.
Therefore, to deter future careless driving, the Legislature
should make the consequences for the negligent death of a pedestrian
more severe. Encouraging high-density development that attracts
people to walk without having severe consequences for negligent
conduct that causes the death of a pedestrian is unconscionable.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020).
Id.
321 Id.
322 “A driver need not be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs to drive recklessly; a
finding of recklessness can be premised upon excessive speed, among other factors.” State v.
Buckley, 78 A.3d 958, 966 (N.J. 2013).
323 “Less than 3 percent (2.7 percent) of Americans walk to work. But more than 5 percent of
workers do in New York City (5.9 percent).” “Five percent of U.S. commuters use transit to
get to work. New York City, with its extensive subway and rail system, is the big outlier
here—more than 30 percent of workers get to their jobs by transit in greater New York City.”
Richard Florida, The Great Divide in How Americans Commute to Work, CITY LAB (Jan. 22,
2019), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/01/commuting-to-work-data-car-publictransit-bike/580507/.
319
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